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Ted V. McAllister p. 1
A Dreadful Emancipation: Walter Lippmann’s Critique of Modernity
[This is a working draft of a larger project on Walter Lippmann’s ideas. Please
do not quote except by the author’s permission.]

Liberals “have forged a weapon of release but not a way of life.”1
I. Progressive Shibboleths
Walter Lippmann began and ended his career reflecting on the problem of freedom
in the modern world. Underlying these reflections ran a deep conviction that he was
living through an age of such great and sweeping transition as to render inherited
ways of thinking and of living suddenly obsolete. Moderns found themselves
emancipated from a wide variety of restrictions, beliefs, and limitations that had
previously provided the “environment” in which specific and inherited freedoms or
liberties made sense. But the new environment was so vast, so complicated, that
individuals cannot comprehend it, rendering the environment in which people must
live and act invisible—a bewildering context that intoxicates some people because
of a sense of endless possibility and enervates others because they sense that they
no longer belong to a story that has meaning. Lippmann believed that in this
modern age that it was the role of the public intellectual, the moral philosopher, to
provide a guide on how to live well in the context of the grand emancipation that is
modernity. Lippmann searched for such a guide, and produced several—all dealing
with the same problem but offering different responses.
A youthful Lippmann found the newly open social, political, moral and intellectual
space of the early 20th century exhilarating. Cleared of old gods, old taboos, of
agrarian habits, of millennia of devotion to metaphysical essences, this dawning age
for America could leave behind the accumulated weight of the past. Drawn first to a
romantic vitalism, Lippmann turned soon to a progressive and scientific model for
organizing social and economic life. This new model would create a new
1
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“disinterested” authority by which a democratic people could transcend pluralism
and form a national community based on rational purposes and human need. The
new freedom of the modern era could leave us adrift, having lost our metaphysical
bearings and our social, cultural and intellectual habits. Or this problem could
become the opportunity to “master” our future, to command nature and society
alike toward human values as seen through the undistorted eyes of science.
Not only as the author of the influential book, Drift and Mastery, but also as one of
the founding editors of New Republic, Lippmann helped shape a progressive version
of American liberalism—a liberalism that would long survive Lippmann’s own
rejection of it. Despite his reasonably quick overcoming of progressivism, the basic
“problems” or questions or themes of this new liberalism would remain alive for
Lippmann throughout his career, and if he cannot be credited with the virtue of
ideological consistency, he deserves admiration for his deep and ruthlessly honest
meditation on the problems of liberal democracy in the modern age. Moreover, a
careful examination of his intellectual journey exposes continuities that are more
important than his political inconsistency. And at the heart of this meditation is the
problem of emancipation, the core of which is found in our freedom from all
inherited forms of authority.
In these early years, Lippmann was utterly untroubled by his claim that “the rock of
ages…has been blasted for us.”2 At this point in his career, this freedom from
inherited authority was a problem of what to do with this freedom, with nary a
question or concern about what might be lost. Still, the problem is a serious one in
the sense that Lippmann considered that the unprecedented nature of this modern
Drift and Mastery, p. 16. I think it is worth noting two points. First, Lippmann does
acknowledge, in a kind of sunny academic fashion, that for a significant number of
people this transition from the authority of religion and tradition to something else
will be difficult. Second, his claim about the degree to which Americans had come
no longer to believe in the old forms of authority were dramatically at odds with the
reality of ongoing and deep persistence of traditional authority. He would later
come to grips with this fact about American life.
2
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society requires the articulation of a “vision” that shapes, creates, or articulates
meaning and purpose—collective and individual. Rejecting all utopian visions, he
urged his readers to concentrate on “the unfolding present” rather than nostalgic
golden ages or an abstract society set in some distant future. The unfolding present
usefully offers Lippmann a horizon “where thought and action count” and where
“man can be creative if his vision is gathered from the promise of actual things.”3
Historical memory is useless or even harmful in the construction of such a vision,
but by focusing on the unfolding present a people can apply a combination of reason
and experience (relevant experience, which precludes anything from a different era)
to posit, adjust, readjust—to craft an evolving and contingent vision or purpose.
Of course Lippmann’s emphasis on reason chastened by experience, on positing and
modifying, springs from his belief that science offers the method that can orient
people in an age without any metaphysical authority. It is a method of living
forward in the context of a constantly changing environment—a method of
adjustment that requires no ossified ideal or immutable morality. Lippmann, as so
many progressives and pragmatists, remained elusive with regard to the meaning of
“science” as applied to social organization. At times one assumes he means
“scientific spirit” or a way of approaching problems that stresses an openness to
what evidence, filtered through a “disinterested” reason, leads one to believe. Other
times “science” stands in for a certain range of modern expertise and knowledge
based loosely on the scientific model—from hard sciences to the social sciences. But
whatever range of meanings that fit into a reified “science,” Lippmann and the other
progressives were challenged to explain how this worked in practice, particularly as
applied to a democracy where few people approach life in the unfolding present
with a scientific spirit.
Democracy, nonetheless, was central to Lippmann’s progressive vision, and yet
deeply problematic. The problem of democracy, which would unfold over the
3
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course of decades of reflections on this “unfolding present,” would force Lippmann
to re-think both authority and science. Always rejecting metaphysical or mystical
descriptions of democracy, or the “will of the people,” Lippmann wanted to associate
democracy with science and open-ended change. “There is nothing accidental”
Lippmann asserted in Drift and Mastery, “in the fact that democracy in politics is the
twin-brother of scientific thinking. They have come together. As absolutism falls,
science arises. It is self-government….The scientific spirit is the discipline of
democracy, the escape from the drift, the outlook of a free man.”4 Such a close and
ambiguous association between democracy and science leaves more questions
unresolved. How to inculcate such a scientific spirit into the people of a democracy?
Lippmann assumed, in 1914, that the work of science was already so extensive in
destroying the older authorities that this scientific spirit could assume the role of
arbiter in a society otherwise threatened with political and moral drift.
However he understood the problems of science and democracy, Lippmann’s view
required that the nation transcend the Jeffersonian localism still plaguing America
in this industrial, interdependent nation. As the isolated and provincial “villages”
that had characterized the American union were drawn, by the centripetal forces of
modernity, into a national community, science supplied the only means for genuine
community in the midst of such pluralism—“for the discipline of science is the only
one which gives any assurance from the same set of facts men will come
approximately to the same conclusion.”5 And so, beyond our differences we have
available a method of analysis that will bring agreement.
The problem of liberal democracy is not finally resolved by the scientific spirit
alone, for modern society is complex, interdependent and incomprehensibly big,
requiring a nation to organize and plan according to the needs and purposes of the
society in light of current circumstances. Such organization requires a robust
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administrative state that has access to experts in a wide variety of fields and
possessing the power to standardize policies and procedures across the nation.
Still more, modern liberal democracy requires vigorous, enlightened, and
charismatic leadership. A political leader, such as Theodore Roosevelt, can provide
the organizing vision necessary for a nation to reform, to adjust, to move forward in
the unfolding present. Politicians like William Jennings Bryan represent the worst
habits of America to preserve in amber “a nation of villagers”. “Bryan,” wrote
Lippmann in a scathing assault, “has never been able to adjust himself to the new
world in which he lives. That is why he is so irresistibly funny to sophisticated
newspaper men. His virtues, his habits, his ideas, are the simple, direct, shrewd
qualities of early America. He is the true Don Quixote of our politics, for he moves in
a world that has ceased to exist.”6 The kind of leader needed in this new America is
one who feels no devotion to inherited principles and who can adopt the emerging
knowledge and expertise in a vision that he can express as a “deliberate plan” to
organize the cooperative potential of a great and powerful nation toward a
collective or common purpose.
No matter how much a progressive conception of democracy requires enlightened
leadership and a large administrative state animated with the spirit of science, it
nonetheless must raise up, habituate, or cultivate a citizenry capable of participating
in the ongoing task of national governance. Little wonder that education is a
defining progressive ideal. In the modern age, education must begin by reeducating—liberating people from beliefs, traditions, and customs of a previous
age—the age that Bryan still believed existed. For a progressive like the young
Lippmann, then, education meant undermining obsolete protections of inherited
authority and fixed moral codes while encouraging citizens to think in terms of a
public interest in which they have a part and a stake, to accept the new “discipline”

6
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of science as the best means of adjusting to changing environments, and to treat
“facts” rather than prejudices as the foundation of informed public opinion.
The educated citizenry—essential to any progressive vision of democracy—was the
first link that failed for Lippmann in this chain of reasoning. It wouldn’t be the last.
Frustrated with his experiences during World War I, in which his participation in,
and close study of, propaganda led him to worry about the ability to “manufacture
consent”7 from the public. By 1919 Lippmann had begun to doubt the most mystical
of progressive constructions—the public. In less than a decade he would produce
three books on the public, each a more radical and compelling critique of the
progressive faith in a meaningful notion of public, public interest, or public good.
In any “science” the results depend on the quality of the data, the facts, the
information. If either government or private entities can control, manipulate, limit,
the news that informs citizens and shapes their beliefs, then a democratic public,
properly understood, is impossible. And so it was with the necessary connection
between news and the shaping of public opinion that Lippmann first turned in his
analysis. The result, published in 1920, was a slim volume entitled Liberty and the
News. Reading the book from the perspective of his later books on related subjects
may obscure the intellectual dynamite of this work.
Two organizing themes that had long been part of Lippmann’s intellectual
orientation became central points in this analysis. First, drawing from Graham
Wallas’ argument in The Great Society that in the modern world the environment in
which people move and act and in which they must participate is so large as to make
most of it invisible and almost unfathomable. The size of modern society makes
problematic the democratic faith in the individual to make wise political choices.
When society was small and local, individuals could reasonably expect to have the
Long before Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman published Manufacturing
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988), Lippmann used the term in
Liberty and the News (1920). P. 8.
7
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knowledge appropriate to the environment and therefore have access to the facts
relevant to making a political or policy choice. But no more—an informed choice
about an environment that is invisible requires that some form of news and fact
gathering and distribution provide citizens with a reliable picture of the society they
inhabit and in which they are expected to participate as citizens.
Because Lippmann considered this change in the environmental irreversible, he
believed that the very health of both liberty and “western democracy” was at stake
in fostering a reliable, objective, and thorough stream of news that can inform
citizens with facts about a world they cannot experience directly. Often angry in
tone, Lippmann chastised the journalists and news producers in America for having
abandoned their duty to supply facts rather than opinions. He wrote: “When those
who control [news columns and carriers] arrogate to themselves the right to
determine by their own consciences what shall be reported and for what purpose,
democracy is unworkable. Public opinion is blocked. For when a people can no loner
confidently repair ‘to the best fountains for their information,’ then anyone’s guess
and anyone’s rumor, each man’s hope and each man’s whim becomes the basis of
government.” (italics added)8
The second assumption that Lippmann carried over from his earlier work to this
analysis is that in modern America public opinion is effectively sovereign. A baffled
or confused public opinion invites tyranny, threatens liberty. Lippmann’s
confidence had turned to fears. Liberty is insecure in a context when “men…have
lost their grip upon the relevant facts of their environment” because they become
victims of propaganda. Unable to know the environment through their own
experiences, people are increasingly supplied with a “pseudo-environment.”9
Never one to possess deep faith in the natural rationality of people, Lippmann
warned that “unreason” must necessarily control public opinion when facts are
8
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unknown or are jumbled with lies, distortions, or propaganda. The inherited theory
of liberty, as developed by John Milton and John Stuart Mill, predates the authority
of public opinion and is ill-suited to this new context. Such a theory focused on
tolerating the expression of a wide range of views, but, Lippmann argued, it rested
finally on tolerating views about which society is indifferent. But the range of views
about which moderns can be indifferent is smaller and differently constructed in an
age when the power of public opinion is both decisive and is open to be shaped or
manufactured by either government or private interests. In modern America “the
really important thing is to try and make opinion increasingly responsible to the
facts. There can be no liberty for a community which lacks the information by which
to detect lies.”10
This line of reasoning led Lippmann back to a problem that he could not resolve in
this book, though he tried. Not only did Lippmann not face directly his own view
that humans, under the best of circumstances, tend to be irrational, but he was
forced back to progressive answers to progressive problems. Consider this claim:
“There is but one kind of unity possible in a world as diverse as ours. It is the unity
of method, rather than aim; the unity of the disciplined experiment.” The resolution
of the problem requires not only devotion to some method derived loosely from the
scientific method, but it requires the inculcation of the scientific spirit, which leads
the public to accept a “unity of methods rather than aims.” He pushed further:
“There is but one bond of peace that is both permanent and enriching: the
increasing knowledge of the world in which freedom occurs. With a common
intellectual method and a common area of valid fact, differences may become a form
of cooperation and cease to be irreconcilable antagonism.” Moreover,
“that…constitutes the meaning of freedom for us.”11
What Lippmann seems only partially to have acknowledged is that his definition of
freedom rests on an anthropological transformation. The public must be shaped
10
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into a responsible public, rather than what Ortega would later call a mass. A proper
public requires citizens who are rational, who have largely rejected the authority of
tradition or religion, and who embrace the scientific model as the appropriate
method for making political decisions. Largely ignoring this problem in his first
book on the subject, Lippmann focused on the task of providing reliable information
to the public.12 But the anthropological problem would not leave him alone.
II. Knowledge, Reason, and the Public Good
In a letter to Learned Hand in 1922, just after the publication of Public Opinion,
Lippmann asked: “Have we the right to believe that human reason can uncover the
mechanism of unreason, and so in the end master it?”13 This question threads
through Lippmann’s body of work in ways most instructive. A rationalist who
sought to understand the world in all its complexity, Lippmann early accepted as
undeniably true that humans are essentially irrational creatures. For this reason he
had little sympathy with many academic analyses that focused on institutions to the
neglect of human nature. On this he was influenced by his teacher Graham Wallas,
whose book Human Nature in Politics shaped Lippmann’s intellectual trajectory
more than any other book of his college years. Lippmann began his career with a
book, A Preface to Politics, wherein he employed Freudian concepts as a way of
accepting, understanding, and then mastering or channeling human irrationality. By
the 1950s Lippmann appealed to the humanizing or civilizing clothing of Natural
Law and the moral traditions of Western civilization to combat naked or primitive
Lippmann’s prescription focused primarily on the education of journalists to
know their job in informing public opinion. He wanted them to abandon their pet
theories, to become more precise with their words, to devote themselves to the
“discipline of a modernized logic,” and to “know that the world is a process.” In the
process of such advice, he offered this summary: “The task of liberty, therefore, falls
roughly under three heads, protection of the sources of the news, organization of
the news so as to make it comprehensible, and education of human response.”
(Liberty and the News, p. 65.) The final phrase—education of human response—is
stunning in its bland assertion of re-education.
13 Quoted in Ronald Steel’s Walter Lippmann and the American Century, p. 183.
12
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desires that otherwise control human choices. Along the way from Freud to natural
law, Lippmann never forgot that some mastery or control over natural humans was
necessary for human flourishing.
During the second decade of Lippmann’s career he began a process of adopting a
philosophical tradition that ran from Plato through Aristotle, Machiavelli and
Hobbes and then to Hamilton—and later in his career a wide variety of others out of
the Natural Law tradition. Lippmann always drew from a variety of teachers and
thinkers and one can often trace developments in his thought by following these
shifting influences. Coming out of college Lippmann put together his arguments out
the ideas of William James, H.G. Wells, a variety of continental thinkers, a dose of
John Dewey, and, of course, the ever present Graham Wallas. Before he published
Public Opinion, one is hard pressed to detect the influence of any thinker not alive
when Lippmann came of age. But from 1922 forward, Lippmann conversed deeply
with the major thinkers of the Western tradition. The change is important and
suggests, among other things, that Lippmann found the constant play of the
“unfolding present” unsatisfying and incapable of providing the resources he needed
to answer the pressing questions or problems that defined his career. Without fully
realizing it yet, Lippmann’s turn to the rich resources of a western humanist
tradition was a rejection of the idea of the “unfolding present” and with it the
attending faith in science and democracy.
And so, Public Opinion begins in Plato’s cave. 14 Shadows seem real, knowledge is
impossible for those who remain in the cave, and those who escape to see things as
they really are present a comic or frightening prospect for the many. Lippmann
rejected the democratic teaching that a public can be enlightened, that a democracy
on the scale of a nation can educate the citizens to be rational participants in policy
or governance—and, most demoralizing of all for the progressives he had
abandoned, Lippmann penned one of the most devastating assault on the idea of the
He placed on long portion of Plato’s description of the cave on the page before the
table of contents. Public Opinion, p, vii.
14
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citizens composing a community of purpose, a public dedicated to some higher
public good.
The problem of democracy is the problem of knowledge. The dominant strain of
democratic thought never acknowledged the problem since it’s advocates assume
the capacity of citizens to have the necessary knowledge to make reasonable
judgments. Lippmann associates this view of what he calls “the omnicompetent
citizen” with Thomas Jefferson. Of course Jefferson spoke of a democracy on the
scale of a village, where all citizens had sufficient knowledge about their
environment to make reasonable choices in the context of their self-interest.
Lippmann noted that at the national level the founders never supposed that they
had established a democracy, much less that they should rely on citizens, scattered
in hamlets and towns across a vast and diverse nation, to make informed judgments.
Beginning with Andrew Jackson, the superstitions of local democracy were applied
to national politics, creating an unwarranted faith in the political wisdom of
ordinary citizens and developing the decisive democratic force, called public
opinion.15
If public opinion is the prime power in democratic society and politics, then what is
it? To define public opinion Lippmann contrasted the “world outside” with the
“pictures in our heads.” The world outside is real enough and yet it is so vast and
complicated that humans cannot see it as it is. Simple versions of the world, often of
a comforting variety, provide us with “maps of the world” or “pictures in our heads”
of how things are. “The pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, or by

Oddly, Lippmann has almost nothing to say about Alexis de Tocqueville’s
extended analysis of American democracy, much less of his argument about the role
of public opinion in democratic politics. His few references (which become a bit
more numerous later in his career) to Tocqueville indicate only a passing knowledge
of the work. At one point in Public Opinion Lippmann noted that there exists almost
no serious analysis on public opinion before his own—a strange claim if one had
read carefully Democracy in America. (p. 161)
15
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individuals acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with capital letters.”16
And so while public opinion forms a false reality, our reactions affect the real
environment of which the public has a distorted view. Under the best of
circumstances, decision makers have a huge task to gain a sufficiently cosmopolitan
perspective to make rational choices based on available information, but when, as in
modern democracy, decisions depend heavily on the influence of public opinion,
drawn from almost exclusively provincial sources incapable of having the requisite
information, rational policy making is impossible.
Lippmann thus declared, in contrast to his progressive colleagues and his own
plaintive call for preserving the source and purity of information upon which
citizens depend, that the problem of modern democracy can never be solved by
seeking to make citizens competent. It is the theory of democracy that is at fault—a
theory that rests uncritically on a faith in the “omnicompetence” of the citizen.
Much of the brilliance of this book lies in the systematic destruction of this
democratic faith—an analysis that is as damning today as it was in 1922. Among
other things, Lippmann noted the speed of modern life that makes it impossible to
make sense of “the great booming, buzzing confusion of the outer world” without
recourse to a pre-determined model or framework that allows one to filter the
information that we confront. As he put it, “we do not first see, and then define, we
define first and then see.”17
How much could we reasonably expect from citizens who live busy lives, who must
depend upon distant sources to provide them with crucial information about the
world in which they live, and whose preparation for interpreting information is
necessarily limited by time, skill, and training? In order for citizens to have a
reasonable hope of seeing the world as it is more clearly, they would have to digest
Public Opinion, p. 18.
The influence of William James is still evident here as Lippmann uses selfconsciously the language of “blooming, buzzing confusion” to describe the nature of
the reality we experience without the filter of cultural and linguistic forms. Public
Opinion, pp. 54-55.
16
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detailed and precise reports on all manner of public matters. But citizens possess a
very poor vocabulary for the task of analysis. Not only do they not possess the
range of words appropriate to the task, but the tendency in any language to allow
words to be generalized symbols of meanings, capable of diverse and even
contradictory meanings among the readers is exaggerated in democracies.18 And if
democrats use words imprecisely, they operate with a very simple and false theory
of causality. “The more untrained a mind,” wrote Lippmann, “the more readily it
works out a theory that two things which catch its attention at the same time are
causally connected.”19
The weakness in the rational faculties of a democratic public make it vulnerable to
propaganda and to concerted efforts by government or powerful private interests to
shape the pictures in people’s heads—to manufacture public opinion. If those who
seek to manufacture opinion know how to use symbols well and to craft a coherent
accounting of selective facts, then the consumers of such propaganda have no access
to resources by which to challenge the pictures with which they are presented.
Because the “public” is not capable of self-articulation or of deliberation, its role is
limited but powerful. The public cannot choose leaders, it cannot choose policies, it
cannot articulate a vision for the nation, it cannot in any meaningful way be creative.
Rather the primary power of the public is to say “yes or no.” A small group of people
choose the slate of possible leaders from which the public may choose. A few
powerful people articulate a vision and set of policies that they present to the public,
and the public can vote for or against such people. The public can say yes to the
party in power or it can side with the party that has not been in power. But the
public is powerless to create its own vision.
Lippmann’s analysis of language appears, primarily in chapter 5. His argument
about the tendency to general words in public discourse and to the way that words
increasingly express rich and ambiguous images, does not press as far as one might
expect. This is one example of Lippmann making arguments that Tocqueville made
much better.
19 Public Opinion, p. 99.
18
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In diagnosis, Public Opinion remains a masterpiece of analysis. But Lippmann’s
attempt to outline a remedy is unconvincing, even to the author who soon wrote a
book rejecting it. It is, nonetheless, instructive in several ways. For one, Lippmann’s
longstanding defense of what on might call Machiavellian virtu, finds subtle
expression in this book on the failings of democratic theory. If propaganda by the
Hearsts and Pulitzers dismayed Lippmann, he admired the manly virtue of great
leaders who can offer a compelling vision, whose strength of will gives both
direction and energy to public opinion. If Jeffersonianism is the problem of
American democracy, Hamiltonianism is a desirable alternative.
Oddly, however, Lippmann’s more developed response to the failings of modern
democracy was to advocate the administrative state—a state administered by the
emerging knowledge of experts. Rather than putting science as the means for
democratic participation, he wants to give science the role of administering a
democracy in a manner that is in the best interest of the citizens, who themselves
cannot know what is in their best interest. While it isn’t exactly rule by the
competent, it is a vision that requires that technical expertise be pressed into
service of making intelligible the vast and complex environment that leaders require
to make rational decisions.
Social scientists, he admitted, have few accomplishments to show for their work—
but “the social scientist will acquire his dignity and his strength when he has worked
out his method. He will do that by turning into opportunity the need among
directing men of the Great Society for instruments of analysis by which an invisible
and most stupendously difficulty environment can be made intelligible.” This looks
more like faith than reason. But at its heart is the belief that with an evolving
method of analysis that in the social realm we can develop “disinterested” analysis
that supplies, in some part of the our environment, a clear and accurate picture of
how things really are. Unlike his earlier prescription in Liberty and the News, where
he thought that preserving objective information flows to the citizens would
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produce good government and policy, Lippmann turned to clusters of experts who,
collectively, could do what newspapers could never—provide a reasonably accurate
picture of the invisible environment. In 1920 Lippmann accepted the competence of
the citizen to take reliable information and shape a reasonably accurate picture of
the world he inhabits—by 1922 he transferred that role to social scientists.
Key to Lippmann’s thinking on this subject is that knowledge of one’s environment
is the prerequisite for making rational choices. Accepting Aristotle’s claims that
democracy must be limited to the “range of their vision” to be workable, Lippmann
suggested that the progress of social science and technical knowledge makes
possible the creation of a true picture of this vast environment. But beyond this, in
the closing chapters of this skeptical book, Lippmann anticipated that the expansion
of objective knowledge generated by a maturing class of experts will cultivate in the
public itself a “reeducation” to defer to those who possess the knowledge, and for
themselves to do what has heretofore been rare—develop a passion for reason. In
the end Lippmann advocated what he had claimed was impossible earlier in his
book—the cultivation of an educated citizenry that can form a rational public.
Almost as soon as his book was published, Lippmann undermined his own remedy,
and his irrational faith.
Lippmann’s book really poses the epistemological problem of democracy: how can
those who rule possess the knowledge necessary to rule well? Aristotle’s answer
was correct with regard to democracy as such—only a polis small enough for the
citizens to know their environment well can be truly self-governing. If the
environment of the democracy is too vast and complicated to make knowledge of it
possible, then Plato’s cave serves as the more reasonable description of the public—
governed by opinions generated by image-makers. As much as Lippmann wanted to
rehabilitate the public that he had so powerfully analyzed, he could not.
When Lippmann couldn’t rehabilitate the public, he decided to shatter it—to
destroy utterly the progressive fantasy of a general will or of the public as national
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community. And whenever Lippmann brought out Occam’s razor, he did so with
ruthless consistency, usually in a fit of remorse for his own misplaced idealism. And
both of these he did in his 1927 book, The Phantom Public. Not only did he label the
grounding assumptions of democracy “false ideals,” but he argued that holding these
ideals is harmful—and even if we are in no position to offer a remedy for this
romantic myth of democracy, we are best served by paying tribute to truth. Better
to be “disenchanted” than to believe the shadows on the wall.20
It is hard to read The Phantom Public without feeling Lippmann’s relief or liberation
from having to defend misty dreams of progressive liberals. Written with clear,
direct, and punchy prose, and with devastatingly simple logic, The Phantom Public
clears the deck of the fuzzy language, the distorting reifications, and the moralizing
nonsense of progressivism. For some readers—then and now—his argument may
sound too narrowly analytical, and yet Lippmann was at his best, his most authentic,
when he was de-mythologizing. When he dismissed the claim that a vote is “the
expression of our mind” as “an empty fiction,” Lippmann was not only seeking
precision and clarity, but highlighting democratic bombast and the lazy habit of
attributing a simple and clear causality to collective choices. Voting is nothing more
than “a promise of support.”21 To read an electoral victory as a clear statement of
public opinion is absurd, even if doing so reinforces our democratic myth of some
organic or even mythical body called the public. “The decision to make the mark
[i.e., vote] may be for reasons a1, a2, a3…..an: the result, whether an idiot or a genius
has voted, is A.” Moreover, “the more complex the collection of men the more
ambiguous must be the unity and the simpler the common ideas.”22

In the final paragraph of the book, Lippmann wrote: “I have no legislative
program to offer, no new institutions to propose. There are, I believe, immense
confusions in the current theory of democracy which frustrate and pervert its
action. I have attacked certain of the confusions with no conviction except that a
false philosophy tends to stereotype thought against the lessons of experience.” The
Phantom Public, p. 190.
21 The Phantom Public, pp. 46-47.
22 The Phantom Public, p. 39.
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Tired of “national souls, and oversouls, and collective souls” invented by people
seeking to find a moral unity that absorbs and incorporates all the elements of our
manifest pluralism, Lippmann wanted to emphasize the constant change that is part
of all human life, including political life. Rather than beginning with abstract or
universal moral codes—which are so easy to declare—Lippmann, following the
teaching of Socrates, argued that a code of right and wrong must wait upon a
perception of the true and the false.” Knowledge is virtue and any claim of ought
must rest on a deep knowledge of what is.
Modern America possesses no overarching authority, no myth or story that compels
universal or near-universal assent. Rather, a welter of moral systems and other
beliefs produce the environment in which any serious political system must
function. The tendency in democracy to foster universalist categories only hides the
truth behind a metaphysical or moral cloak. “An established right,” he wrote, “is a
promise that a certain kind of behavior will be backed by the organized force of the
state or at least by the sentiment of the community; a duty is a promise that failure
to respect the rights of others in a certain way will be punished.”23 There is
nothing fixed about rights and duties and to invest them with more fixed and
transcendent meaning only leads to harmful confusions.
Of course the primary reification that Lippmann dissolves is the public—the
repository of most important liberal dreams. In his previous book, Lippmann
challenged the belief in the omnicompetent citizen and the expectation that through
education and reliable information that the public can, in a modern democracy,
deliberate or form informed opinions. He held out hope that the public could be led
by experts who accept the scientific discipline and can produce the “disinterested”
knowledge that allow reason to overcome provincial stereotypes and limited vision.
In The Phantom Public there is no longer a public; information flows overwhelm and
confuse citizens; there is no disinterested knowledge class that can lead a
23
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democratic public; and political power is essentially a struggle between small
groups of people who only rarely rouse popular sentiment for or against their
positions.
The closest thing to a public opinion, in Lippmann’s view, is an emotion rather than
an ideology or political philosophy. The struggle among the contending groups of
political figures for public support amounts to “the use of symbols which assemble
emotions after they have been detached from their ideas.” Ideas rarely move
people—but playing to emotions allows political figures “to make a homogeneous
will out of a heterogeneous mass of desires.” When political matters are of matters
of visible significance or when citizens are dissatisfied or a clear crisis emerges, “the
victorious alternative is executed not by the mass but by individuals in control of its
energy.”24
Because there is no “public” that can act on its own and because the energy latent in
the mass of citizens is only marshaled by political leaders, the study of modern
democracy must be about the means by which political leaders can constitute a
public when they need one. Any analytical definition of a public (rather than “the”
public) is relative to the issue—publics form because groups of citizens are
“interested” in a policy or political question. The public that applies to the
regulation of railroads will include farmers who rely on railroads to get their crops
to market, it will include railroad unions, and a variety of groups for whom policy
changes will affect their lives. No reified Public capable of making “disinterested”
decisions for the good of the nation will ever be constituted for such a political fight.
Civic education and a reliable press will not alter this fact. In the broadest sense, the
only work or role that these publics can play is to support either those who have
power (the “ins”) or to move their energy and support to those who have been
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advocating change (the “outs”). However unromantic this description of public
deliberation, Lippmann argued that it “is the essence of popular government.”25
Lippmann was not content with demythologizing liberal ideals of democratic
participation. He made a case for the harm of liberal ideals—and a case for a
Machiavellian science of democratic politics. He wrote, for instance:
A false of ideal of democracy can led only to disillusionment and to
meddlesome tyranny. If democracy cannot direct affairs, then a
philosophy which expects it to direct them will encourage the people to
attempt the impossible; they will fail, but that will interfere outrageously
with the productive liberties of the individual. The public must be put in
its place, so that it may exercise its own powers, but no less and perhaps
even more, so that each of us may live free of the trampling and the roar
of a bewildered herd.26
Liberalism—to employ a reification that Lippmann tolerated—had elevated the
common person, had liberated people from a great many restraints, had educated
them to think of themselves as equal parts of the democratic process, but it had not
taught the people the role that they could reasonably play. Liberalism had fostered
the conditions for a new kind of tyranny—“of the trampling and the roar of a
bewildered herd.”
In the concluding short chapters of The Phantom Public, Lippmann restated,
reoriented, the defining questions of his career in a way that would lead to his
magnus opus, A Preface to Morals (1929). How can we live well, how can we be
genuinely free in an age liberated from authoritative myths that define human
meaning and give direction to human conduct? In a little more than a decade
Lippmann had travelled from celebrating this liberation as the precondition for
human mastery to a more mature meditation on the challenges of living in an openended universe.
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It would be convenient to lump much of Lippmann’s writings in the 1920s into the
broad category of the lost generation or even attach him to the strange cult of
disillusionment of the era. A few passages here and there suggest connections with
Joseph Wood Krutch’s The Modern Temper, but it would be a mistake to attach to
Lippmann such debilitating pessimism. Lippmann’s work in this period bears two
characteristics—an attempt to describe precisely and fairly the problem of freedom
and authority in America at the time and to articulate a manly and affirming
response that rejects self-indulgent nihilism.27
The problem with liberals is that “they have forged a weapon of release but not a
way of life.” While the precise meaning of “liberalism” is never clear in Lippmann’s
work, here it incorporates the great emancipation project that extends back to the
Enlightenment and whose primary tool is the ability to bring to doubt beliefs or
ideas that had for so long been authoritative. Liberalism, in his construction,
introduced into American society broadly a historicism—a recognition that all
human ideals are products of time and place, of culture and experience, and
therefore not universally valid. Such liberation from inherited authority might, as
he advocated in Drift and Mastery, give new space for a democratic people to define
for themselves their lives, their goals their purposes, their chosen telos. But the
essentially negative project—the freeing from inherited beliefs and ideas—did not
provide effective means for living forward in this new environment. Liberalism
leads to drift.
Unlike all “political philosophies which active men have lived by,” liberalism
“attempted to eliminate the hero entirely.” Since liberalism accepted the mystical
abstraction of the public, of the people, it believed that it had escaped the “ancient
problem of the One and the Many.” In due course, liberalism (i.e., progressivism)
loses sight not only of heroes, but of the individual as such. As the “Great Society”
One of the most penetrating analyses of the self-indulgent nihilism of many 1920s
intellectuals is Christopher Lasch’s brief “The Illusion of Disillusionment.” New
Oxford Review LVIII, no. 7 (July-August 1991): 12-14.
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produced ever-greater interdependence and shielded more and more the real
environment from people, the individual became increasingly small and isolated.
Local answers to problems were increasingly rare and ineffective—as the
prohibition issue proved—and as the causes that effected people’s lives become
more remote, an increasingly centralized government that must deal
comprehensively with any issue, becomes necessary. As local rule recedes and local
consent (to say nothing about deliberation) unnecessary, the wellsprings of local
political talent dry up. Citizens, disconnected from regular participation in decisions
that matter, focus more on self-expression than civic participation.
Lippmann concludes The Phantom Public with a description of a democratic system
that traffics in abstractions, that believes in the consent of the people while forced to
ever more centralized means of addressing the problems of the Great Society. The
personification of the public only hides the real mechanisms of power while
ignoring the greatest political need of all—the education and development of
leaders who possess the knowledge (virtu) to lead a people.

III. Emancipation and the Problem of Freedom

If the public is a phantom, majority rule or power is very real and a threat to liberty,
according to Lippmann. In response to two court trials concerning public education,
Lippmann wrote his most under-appreciated book, American Inquisitors, in which he
warned that the powers of majorities in America were dangers to liberty. In
Tennessee a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools led to
the so-called Scopes Monkey trial. Bringing to the same courtroom Clarence
Darrow, defender of a crude form of Social Darwianism, and William Jennings Bryan,
the long-time defender of the common man against the power of concentrated
economic power, the trial was the first great media event in America. The other
trial, nearly forgotten today, concerned the right of Chicago political leaders to
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dictate the content of history texts taught in public schools so as to reflect an
appropriately patriotic view (i.e., anti-British view).
Given the centrality of education to the progressive agenda, it was inevitable that
the expansion of public-funded education would spark debates about who should
decide what is taught, and by what criteria. Lippmann’s analysis is much more
complex and subtle than most commentators as he sought to raise the defining
themes of popular rule and place them in the context of modern challenges to
religious authority.
Originally delivered as lectures at the University of Virginia, the public university
founded by Thomas Jefferson as testimony to his faith in the power and persuasion
of reason in a democratic society, Lippmann chose to make Jefferson’s philosophical
and political beliefs the primary object of his criticism. He noted a curious similarity
between Jefferson’s “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom” of 1786 and the antievolutionary law from Tennessee. Despite the differences “in spirit and purpose” of
these two documents, they were bound together by this wording from the Virginia
statute which says that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.” (Italics in
Lippmann’s text.) 28 Because the Tennessee law applied only to teaching using
public funds, its defenders could easily agree with Jefferson’s argument that it was
sinful to force people to pay for the propagation of opinions that they do not believe.
Given that the majority of people in the state did not accept the science of evolution,
to tax them to fund the propagation of this idea would violate Jefferson’s dictum.
And so it was here, where the tension between those who defend reason and those
who defend majority rule was so manifestly evident, that Lippmann sought to
explore the contradictions in the prevailing democratic theory.
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To explore these tensions, Lippmann used several fictional conversations. He began
by bringing to Olympus Socrates, Jefferson, and William Jennings Bryan. Bryan, who
became in the Scopes trial the voice of popular rule, understood himself to be a
Jeffersonian—and despite Jefferson’s own complaints, Lippmann found that Bryan
was correct with regard to his defense of popular democracy. Socrates, not only the
notorious questioner, but also a man famed for dying at the hands of majority rule,
challenges the idealistic rationalism of Jefferson.
When Socrates establishes that Jefferson believes both in majority rule and that
reason will prevail in free inquiry, he asks the American president about the official
beliefs of the state. “None” came the answer of the naïve rationalist. Lippmann,
speaking through Socrates, responded:
I don’t understand you. You say there were many people in your day who
believed that God had revealed the truth about the universe. You then tell
me that officially your citizens had to believe that human reason and not
divine revelation was the source of truth, and yet you say your state has no
official beliefs. It seems to me it had a very definite belief….Let us be frank.
Did you not overthrow a state religion based on revelation and establish in
its place the religion of rationalism?
Lippmann introduced the problem inherent in asking questions of religious
authority. What he later called “the acids of modernity,” the questioning spirit, calls
revelation to the bar of human reason and therefore challenges in this very process
the precondition for religious authority as a public principle.
Jefferson, as Lippmann characterized him, accepted both the “fundamental right” of
the majority to rule and the “fundamental right” of freedom of thought. The
contradiction between these inevitably, Lippmann argued, favors one side over the
other. “For it is a curious fact that in the conflict between reason and authority, the
conflict itself is a victory for reason.” The “inquisitions” from democratic majorities
are evidence of retreat and, more importantly, a defensiveness of the sort that killed
Socrates.
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Socrates declared that “reason has never been popular” and despite Jefferson’s faith
in the power of reason to persuade, Socrates insisted that common people naturally
fear reason because it serves as a competitor religion. Reason, or the “scientific
spirit” breeds habitual doubt, skepticism—common people “want ideas which they
can count upon” rather than a tolerant skepticism. The life of reason or science
requires freedom, but very few people can be free. Socrates was free because he
wanted very little, “but people are never free who want more than they can have.
Their wants create worries, their worries create prejudices, their prejudices
demand guaranties, and under freedom of thought nothing is guaranteed.”29 The
blithe attack by H.L. Menken or Clarence Darrow on the beliefs on the many is
destructive to freedom for it destroys—in a manner that is offensive—the authority
that provides most people with safeguards to self-rule. Meanwhile, many such
critics of religious authority have come to depend on their own deterministic
religion just as much, and so do not live by the scientific spirit.30 For others, refusing
to understand the differences among humans, the differences of soul between the
many and those who are capable of the philosophical life, they naively destroy those
they seek to liberate—and rather than safeguard reason, they likely will unleash
irrationality since the needs of most people are not satisfied by a life of reason.
Lippmann mercilessly pilloried the faux sophisticate know as the Christian
modernist—an intellectual type of the 1920s who accepted without fear or angst (or
great thought) the basic moral truths of Christianity while rejecting the supportive
cosmic narrative presumed by fundamentalists as literally true. In a dialogue
between the modernist and the fundamentalist, Lippmann offered a logical,
consistent, informed, and rhetorically brilliant fundamentalist to destroy the

American Inquisitors, pp., 45-49.
Lippmann, using Socrates, characterized Clarence Darrow this way: “When Mr.
Darrow was younger than he is today, scientific men found the hypothesis of
mechanism rather convenient. Mr. Darrow has been teaching this hypothesis as
gospel ever since. He is very orthodox. It is a sad and kindly religion which may
have quite a vogue.” American Inquisitors, p. 43.
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modernist argument.31 The modernist, when the discussion turns to education,
wants to teach students in the questioning spirit and he wants them to learn to
judge all claims on the authority by their own reason—in other words, to
systematically reject the belief that one should accept tradition and revelation as
authority. “Each youngster is,” the Fundamentalist notes, “under your system, to
face the temptations and perplexities of the world with nothing more than a
tentative moral code which he is at liberty to revise as he sees fit. How do you
distinguish this beautiful theory from sheer moral anarchy?”
The exchange between the Modernist and the Fundamentalist about the source of
moral authority is instructive in many ways. In Lippmann’s view, the modernist is
naïve and possesses a faith in common sense and human decency to replace the
religious authority that had previously supplied humans with their moral code. The
modernist accepts human goodness and natural ability to discern a morality without
supernatural support. The Fundamentalist does not deny that some people (the
few) are capable of living by the highest moral standards, but Lippmann has him
express his own views that the modernist’s “natural man is a natural barbarian,
grasping, selfish, lustful and murderous.” The hope for a moral society is the
transformation of human will and nature—the civilizing of barbarian instincts. All
popular morality has “had some sort of supernatural sanction.”
The Fundamentalist, speaking for Lippmann, presents the Modernist as ignorant
about human nature and political reality. The modernist wishes to inculcate the
scientific method in people who cannot understand it. Because he does not
understand fundamentalism or most religious authority, he is blind to the need that
religious faith has to present itself as unquestioned authority. He proposes a life of
metaphysical uncertainty unaware that most humans cannot tolerate such
uncertainty. What Lippmann wanted to stress was that doubt is the essence of the
Lippmann probably modeled the Fundamentalist after the scholar John Gresham
Machen of Princeton, whom Lippmann admired. The Modernist might have been
Shailer Mathews of the University of Chicago.
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life of reason but it is deadly to the life of faith as lived by the majority of believers.
The Fundamentalist had the last word (after he had brought the Modernist to doubt
his own premise): “[F]or me an eternal plan of salvation is at stake. For you there is
nothing at stake but a few tentative opinions none of which means anything to your
happiness. Your request that I should be tolerant and amiable is, therefore, a
suggestion that I submit the foundation of my life to the destructive effects of your
skepticism, your indifference, your good nature. You ask me to smile and to commit
suicide.”32
Lippmann’s answer to the problem of education in a democracy, however, is far
from clear or, I suspect, satisfying for most readers. He characterizes the teacher as
someone who ought not teach modernism or fundamentalism, but someone who
fosters a transition from one to the other. A teacher is not simply concerned with
the truth, but with the means of communicating the truth, the desirability of
communicating the truth, and even the possibility of such communication. In this
sense he must take seriously the spiritual needs of his students. A prudent respect
for the prejudices of his students and their families will impel the teacher to be
sometimes esoteric in his teaching.
But underneath all of these tortured questions of how to live between faith and
science, in an age when humans have been liberated but without any clear objective
in mind, Lippmann grappled with how to manage this transition. He did not seem to
admit that this is a reversible trend or that once religious authority has been forced
to defend itself that it can indefinitely survive the acids of modernity. But neither
does he accept that most humans are capable of living well without recourse to
metaphysical certainty. The future is unknowable and human creativity is
unpredictable, he noted. And then, in ways as oblique as in The Phantom Public,
Lippmann points vaguely to the need for leaders whose grasp of reality, of human
need, is so keen that they will provide a new ordering principle that will protect the
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many from debilitating uncertainty without abandoning the freedom of the few.33
And this is as far as Lippmann could take us—to what he thought was a clear-eyed
view of the present reality and the compelling need for a leader who has escaped the
naïve tyranny of an inherited democratic idealism.
As the 1920s came to a close, Lippmann had abandoned most of his progressive
shibboleths and had come to understand the great emancipation brought about by
science, technology, and intellectual transformations as a particularly dangerous
episode in western civilization. The liberation of the many in the great democratic
transformation of the modern era did not promise wisdom or the triumph of reason.
The rise of science, and particularly of social science, did not prepare the way for an
age of objective knowledge and dispassionate debate. In an age of almost
unprecedented personal liberty, the dissolution of inherited forms of authority did
not guarantee that the individual will long be free from the majority. During the
next fifteen years Lippmann crafted, in fits and starts, without the consistency of a
systematic philosopher, a response to the dreadful emancipation. Beginning with A
Preface to Morals (1929) in which he presented a stoic defense of individual virtue
in the midst of the moral whirl of modern society, he eventually attempted to offer a
secular, humanist version of natural law as the essentialist grounding for political
life. From an advocate of science to a defender of virtue, this is the broad trajectory
of Lippmann’s lifetime struggle to respond to the modern emancipation. The books
examined in this paper expose the period of his career when he could no longer
believe in progressivism but had not yet found his way to natural law.
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See, for instance, his brief discussion of a new kind of leader on page 117.

